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Abstract In the Russian cards problem, Alice, Bob and Cath draw a, b and c cards, respec-
tively, from a publicly known deck. Alice and Bob must then communicate their cards to
each other without Cath learning who holds a single card. Solutions in the literature provide
weak security, where Alice and Bob’s exchanges do not allow Cath to know with certainty
who holds each card that is not hers, or perfect security, where Cath learns no probabilistic
information about who holds any given card. We propose an intermediate notion, which we
call ε-strong security, where the probabilities perceived by Cath may only change by a factor
of ε. We then show that strategies based on affine or projective geometries yield ε-strong
safety for arbitrarily small ε and appropriately chosen values of a, b, c.
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1 Introduction
Consider the following scenario:
Bob is the commander of a team of a + b + c agents and must coordinate a covert
operation. To do this, he must choose a+c of his agents to each carry out an individual
mission and then rendezvous with Alice behind enemy lines. For the safety of the
operation, none of the agents know who else is involved before meeting Alice, and the
only information they can provide her with is their own identity. When they reach the
rendezvous point, only a of them show up and the other c are assumed captured by the
enemy leader, Cath.
In order to coordinate their rescue, Alice and Bob must let each other know which
agents are currently in their camp (and, hence, which are held by Cath). Alice, Bob
and Cath all know the full team’s roster as well as how many men participated in the
operation, but otherwise know only which agents are currently in their own camp.
Moreover, Alice and Bob may only communicate over insecure channels, share no
private information, and are not able to encrypt messages in any way that cannot be
decyphered by Cath. Nevertheless, it is imperative for security reasons that Cath does
not learn the identity of any of the agents in Alice’s camp. Is there a way for Alice and
Bob to share this information securely?
This is a retelling of the Russian cards problem [21], where the ‘team’ is a deck of cards
and the ‘agents’ in Alice, Bob and Cath’s camps are the set of cards in their hand. In more
realistic applications, these soldiers could represent confidential information, such as private
keys, which must be retrieved in case some are lost or leaked to an intruder. The use of a
random deal of cards is convenient in that it allows Alice and Bob to share information with
unconditional security, as described below.
1.1 Notions of cryptographic security
Claude Shannon was one of the first to formalize the study of cryptography. He proposed
several notions of cryptographic security:
Definition 1 Let S be a strategy for sharing information securely. We say that S is
1. computationally secure for a natural number n if at least n operations are needed for an
eavesdropper to obtain a message sent using S (i.e., break S);
2. provably secure with respect to a problem Π (not necessarily related to cryptography)
if Π can be reduced in polynomial time to breaking S, and
3. unconditionally secure if S cannot be broken even with unlimited computational
resources; the eavesdropper simply does not have enough information to reconstruct
the original message.
It is usually very difficult to prove that S is computationally secure, as we would need to
know all possible strategies for an attack. However, it is a good measure of when a system
isn’t secure, that is, when it fails to be secure for a relatively small n. If S is provably secure
with respect to Π , we know that we need at least as many operations to break S as we need
to solve Π . Typically, Π is a ‘hard’ problem, known to be in np but believed not to be in p.
Many of the cryptographic protocols in use today are based on this notion of security.
On the other hand, it should be clear that unconditional security implies both computa-
tional and provable security. As such it would be ideal to develop unconditionally secure
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cryptographic protocols. These, however, have some disadvantages; typically, one requires
a key that is at least the same size as the message and agreeing on the key is generally
as complex as communicating secretly [18], although there are exceptions, e.g. quantum
key distribution, which requires special hardware and currently has other practical limita-
tions [16]. Regardless, unconditional security is desirable in some settings where concerns
about efficiency are superceded by the need for absolute security. In particular, the Russian
cards problem provides a setting for simultaneous, unconditionally secure communication
of multiple datapoints.
1.2 Related work
The use of a deck of cards to communicate securely is not new. For example, [10] considers
a setting where Alice, Bob and Cath each draw cards from a deck. Alice and Bob wish to
share a value which is unknown to Cath; this value is typically one of the cards that is held
by either Alice or Bob. Such a protocol may be used for establishing shared secret keys.
The Russian cards problem uses a similar setup, but instead Alice and Bob wish to com-
municate their entire hand to each other without Cath knowing who holds any card that is not
hers. The problem may be traced back more than 150 years to Kirkman [12], but recently it
has received renewed attention after its inclusion in the 2000Mathematics Olympiad. Rather
than produce a new secret, its goal is to distribute information among Alice and Bob in such
a way that neither possesses the original data, but the two may reconstruct it by pooling
together their individual shares.
Schemes for information-safeguarding protocols have also appeared previously [2,17].
Nevertheless, the Russian cards problem has some unique features. First, the original infor-
mation may be reconstructed securely even if the agents pool together their information
over insecure channels; second, the data may contain multiple bits, each of which is kept
secret after the exchange. A possible drawback is that in the Russian cards literature, there
are typically only two communicating agents, whereas it may be desirable to distribute the
data among a larger number. However, recent work has explored multi-agent generalizations
[7–9].
An instance of the Russian cards problem is parametrized by its distribution type, which
is a triple of natural numbers (a, b, c) indicating how many cards Alice, Bob and Cath hold,
respectively. The problemwas originally posed for deals of distribution type (3, 3, 1), and one
proposed solution uses the Fano plane, a special case of a combinatorial design, which can
also be used for many other distribution types [1]. Another solution uses modular arithmetic,
which can also be generalized for many distribution types where the eavesdropper holds one
card [3]. These solutions use only two announcements, but some distribution types are known
to require more. A solution using three announcements for (4, 4, 2) is reported in [22], and
a four-step protocol where Cath holds approximately the square of the number of cards of
Alice is presented in [4]. The solutions we will work with in this paper are similar to the one
reported in [5], which also takes two steps.
However, while the protocols mentioned above provide unconditionally secure solutions
to the Russian cards problem in that the eavesdropper may not know with certainty who holds
a given card, that does not mean that she may not have a high probability of guessing this
information correctly. To this end, stronger notions of security are studied in [20]. There, a
distinction is made between weak and perfect security; in perfectly secure solutions, Cath
does not acquire any probabilistic information about the ownership of any specific card. All
of the above solutions provide weak security in this sense, but Swanson and Stinson show
how designs may be used to achieve perfect security, an idea further developed in [19].
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The solutions we present here will provide an intermediate level of security between weak
and perfect, controlling the amount of probabilistic information that may be acquired by the
eavesdropper, while having the advantage of being much easier to construct than perfectly
secure solutions.
1.3 Basic notions from finite geometry
The main constructions we will use arise from discrete geometry, and we assume that the
reader has some familiarity with the subject. Recall that if q is a natural number, there exists
a finite field with cardinality q if and only if q is of the form pn , with p a prime and n a
positive integer. This field is unique up to isomorphism and is called the Galois Field of
order q , often denoted GF(q), although we will write it more briefly as Fq .
We denote the affine space of dimension δ over Fq by AG(δ, q). We will refer to an
affine subspace of dimension α as an α-plane, while an α-plane passing through the origin
(i.e., a linear subspace of dimension α) will be referred to as an α-space. Two α-planes
X, Y ⊂ AG(δ, q) are parallel if they are distinct and there exists y ∈ AG(δ, q) such that
Y = y + X .
The projective space of dimension δ over Fq is denoted PG(δ, q), and we will also call
α-dimensional subspaces α-planes. For a more thorough treatment of finite fields and finite
geometry, the reader may consult a text such as [6,13].
1.4 Layout of the article
In Sect. 2 we give an informal discussion of our problem, which we formalize in Sect. 3.
Section 4 then reviews some counting results from finite geometries, and in Sect. 5 we define
the geometric strategies. Section6 gives a rough security analysis which is nevertheless
sufficient to prove that many ε-strong solutions exist, while Sect. 7 gives a more fine-grained
analysis which is useful for finding relatively small triples for which the strategies are ε-
strongly safe. In Sect. 8 we discuss schemes for finding balanced triples and provide many
examples. Finally, Sect. 9 gives a few concluding remarks.
2 A worked example
Let us illustrate the notion of strong security through a relatively small example. Let’s suppose
we have 49 cards, with Alice holding 7, Cath holding 5 and Bob the rest. In this case, Alice
may identify each point in the two-dimensional vector space over F7, denoted AG(2, 7), with
a card. Moreover, she can do this in such a way that her cards (marked by ♠) form a line.
Suppose then that Cath holds the cards marked by ♣, while Bob holds the rest of the cards
(♦) (Fig. 1).
Alice then announces how she has distributed the cards on the plane. In this particular
announcement, Cath’s cards all fall within the same line. This is an extreme case, but it is
a real possibility, as Alice only knows the amount of cards that Cath holds and nothing else
when she makes her announcement. Bob and Cath know that Alice’s hand falls on a line, but
they do not know which line. Bob then knows exactly which cards Alice holds (since there is
only one complete line that he does not hold), but Cath does not. However, she may consider
it more likely that Alice holds one card over another. To illustrate this, let us consider the
points labeled x and y in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 1 Alice (♠) assigns each
card to a point on the plane in
such a way that her hand forms a
line. She does not know how the
other cards will fall, since she can
only see her own hand. In this
example, all of Cath’s cards (♣)
happen to fall on another line
♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠ ♠
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♦ ♦
♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦
First we will take a look at x . Cath knows that, in order for Alice to hold x , one of the
lines that passes through x must be Alice’s hand. We draw these lines on the plane.
Cath knows that not all the lines that pass through x can be Alice’s hand, because if a line
contains a card that belongs to Cath, it clearly cannot be held in its entirety by Alice . In this
case, only one line fits that description, so Cath takes it out of consideration. We denote this
by drawing the line dotted. Every point in the plane has 8 lines that cross it; therefore, the
point x still belongs to 7 hands that could possibly belong to Alice.
However, this is not the case for all cards that Cath does not hold. Let us now turn our
attention to y. While x was colinear with Cath’s hand, all the lines that contain y and one
of Cath’s cards are different. In this case Cath can discard more lines than she could when
considering x . Only 3 possible lines remain, compared to the 7 lines that pass through x
and avoid Cath’s hand. Therefore, it seems to Cath that the point x would be more likely
to belong to Alice’s hand than the point y as there are more possible hands that contain it.
Before the announcement, both cards had the same probability to be in Alice’s hand but after
the announcement, x seems far more likely.
Note that the total number of lines in the announcement is 56. We also know that 36 of
these lines contain a card that Cath holds. This is because there are 8 lines touching each
point, but the 5 points all share 1 line. Therefore Alice’s hand is one of the 20 lines that avoid
Cath’s hand. Of those 20 only 3 contain y compared to the 7 that contain x . Thus, it seems to
Cath that there is a 7/20 = 0.35 probability that Alice holds x compared to 3/20 = 0.15 that
she holds y. Thus, according to the information that Cath has, it is more than twice as likely
that Alice holds x as it is that she holds y.
In this case, we know neither of the cards actually belongs to Alice, but we want to be able
to quantify this information and control it, especially in higher dimensions where it is not as
simple to visualize. Our goal is to show that, by choosing different parameters appropriately,
we can make the probabilities of any two points be arbitrarily close to each other. But first
we need some preliminaries to make this precise.
3 Strategies and probabilistic security
In this section we will set up the basic concepts needed to formalize the Russian cards
problem and different notions of security that one may require from its possible solutions.
We will assume that Alice holds a cards, Bob b and Cath c, and Ω is the set of cards with
|Ω| = a + b + c. A deal (of size (a, b, c)) is a partition (A, B, C) of Ω such that |A| = a,
|B| = b and |C | = c; each of A, B, C represent the hand ofAlice, Bob andCath, respectively.
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◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ◦ ♠ x
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ♣ ◦ ◦
◦ ♠
y
◦ ◦ ◦ ◦ ◦
Fig. 2 Lines that Cath may discard from Alice’s announcement. It is important to note that most of the lines
are truncated, as the natural representation of AG(2, 7) is as a torus and lines are harder to visualize in two
dimensions
3.1 Equitable strategies
In most solutions to the Russian cards problem, Alice makes an announcement, after which
Bob knows the entire deal and thus can make a second (trivial) announcement where he tells
Alice which cards Cath holds. Thus we need only model Alice’s first announcement, and we
follow [20] in referring to the way that Alice is to choose her announcement as a strategy.
Suppose that Alice holds a cards, Bob holds b and Cath holds c. Given a set X and a




the set of n-element subsets of X , and we will refer to






. In Alice’s first announcement she gives a set of possible hands that she
may hold, and thus we may consider an announcement simply as a set A ⊂ (Ωa
)
.
However, there are many possible announcements that may inform Bob of Alice’s hand,
and Alice must have a non deterministic way to choose one out of all the possible announce-
ments. Thus a strategy for Alice consists on a probability distribution among the possible
announcements that she may choose from.





) is a function S that assigns to each hand A ∈ (Ωa
)
a
probability distribution over 2(
Ω
a ). We denote the probability of an announcement A given
the hand A as PS(A|A).
Given a strategy S and a hand A, we will say that A is a possible announcement if
PS(A|A) > 0. The set of possible announcements for A will be denoted by SA.
When it is clear from context, we will drop the subindex S and write simply P(A|A)
to simplify notation. It will also be convenient for computations if the number of possible
announcements is independent ofAlice’s hand. Ifwe could guarantee that there arem possible
announcements for each hand, we could always assign a probability of 1/m to each individual
announcement. If a strategy has this property, we will say it is equitable [20].
Definition 2 A strategyS is equitable if there exists a positive integer m such that, for every
a-set A, |SA| = m and the probability of choosing a particular announcement A ∈ SA is
P(A|A) = 1/m.
One advantage of equitable strategies is that we need less information to specify them
than more general strategies. In particular, we may model equitable strategies merely as a
function
123






where SA is the set of announcements with positive probability (and thus with probability
1/m). Since the geometric strategy, which will be our main focus, is equitable, we will adopt
this presentation.
The first condition that a two-step solution to the Russian cards problem should satisfy
is that Bob should be informed of Alice’s hand after an announcement. Let us make this
precise. First, we introduce an abuse of notation that we will use throughout the text.
If X ⊂ 2Ω and Y ⊂ Ω , define
X\Y = {X ∈ X : X ∩ Y = ∅}.
Thus, X\Y is the set of elements of X avoiding Y .
Definition 3 Fix integers a, b, c and a deck Ω with |Ω| = a + b + c. A strategy S on (Ωa
)
is informative for (a, b, c) if, for every A ∈ (Ωa
)
, B ∈ (Ω\Ab
)
and A ∈ SA, we have that
A\B = {A}.
Thus after an informative announcement, Bob knows exactly which hand A Alice is holding.
But an informative strategy may also give Cath information, and we also require for Alice’s
strategy to be secure.
3.2 Probabilistic security
Before Alice makes an announcement, Cath knows that Alice can possibly hold any hand that




possible hands forAlice. However,
after an announcement, Cath can discard any hand that isn’t found in the announcement. After
doing so, it is possible that Cath acquires new information about the cards she does not hold.
In particular, she may know that there is a high probability that Alice holds a given card.
If Alice and Bob want to communicate securely, it would be desirable to avoid giving Cath
such information.
There are three different notions of probabilistic security for strategies: weak, perfect, and
our notion of ε-strong security, which lies between the other two. Unconditional security
guarantees weak security but nothing more. If we wanted to avoid Cath learning any prob-
abilistic information after an announcement, we would need to ensure that no card seems
more likely after the announcement than it did before. For this, the number of hands in the
announcement (after Cath eliminates the ones which have a card that she holds) that contain a
given cardmust be equal for every card that Cath does not hold. In this case, the probability of
Alice having a set card should stay the same after Alice’s announcement. As a matter of fact,
we know the value of this probability; we must only count the hands that could contain that
card given Cath’s hand and divide it by the number of remaining hands in the announcement:







a + b .
If this number stays constant after Alice’s announcement, we will say that Alice’s strategy
is perfectly secure.





is perfectly secure for (a, b, c) if for every C ∈ (Ωc
)
,
every card x ∈ Ω\C , and every announcement A with P(A|C) 	= 0, we have that
P(x ∈ A|C,A)
P(x ∈ A|C) = 1.
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This notion is equivalent to 1-perfect security in [20] and represents Cath’s inability to
glean information about the position of individual cards. Compare this to weak security,
where we only require that Cath is not certain about the position of any card she does not
hold.





is weakly secure for (a, b, c) if for every C ∈ (Ωc
)
, every
card x ∈ Ω\C , and every announcement A with P(A|C) 	= 0, we have that
0 < P(x ∈ A|C,A) < 1.
In [19], Swanson and Stinson proved that that for a strategy to be perfectly secure, Alice’s
announcement must be a t-design for some t > c. They use this to present examples of
perfectly secure strategieswhenCath has atmost three cards. In principle this can be extended
to larger values of c, since it is known that t-designs exist for arbitrarily large t [11]; however,
they can be difficult to construct. Instead, we will define an intermediate level of security,
where the constraint is relaxed so we can have more flexibility and can work more easily
with cases where Cath’s hand is larger. In fact, this notion will permit us to easily find secure
protocols for any possible hand size that Cath may hold.





is ε-strongly secure for (a, b, c) if for every
C ∈ (Ωc
)
, every card x ∈ Ω\C , and every announcement A with P(A|C) 	= 0, we have that
∣∣∣∣
P(x ∈ A|C,A)
P(x ∈ A|C) − 1
∣∣∣∣ < ε.
As mentioned above, equitable strategies are useful for simplifying computations. In
particular, the above probabilities may be computed by counting. The following result can
be found in [20].










and A is an announcement with P(A|C) > 0 and A ∈ A. Then, P(A|C,A) = 1|A\C | .
In other words, the probability that A is Alice’s hand given Cath’s hand C and the
announcement A (when A is a valid hand given C) is given by the quotient of one over
the number of hands in the announcement that avoid C .
Thus the probability of Alice having a set hand A according to Cath is 1/|A\C |. However,
what we want to calculate is the probability that Alice holds a given card x . For this, we
introduce a new abuse of notation: for X ⊂ 2Ω and y ∈ Ω , set
Xy = {X ∈ X : y ∈ X}.
Thus for Z ⊂ Ω , Xy\Z denotes the set of elements of X which contain y but avoid Z . The
following can also be found in [20].





and (A, B, C) be a deal. If z ∈ Ω\C, then
P(z ∈ A|C,A) = |Az\C ||A\C | .
Our goal is to show that affine and projective spaces can be used to construct ε-strongly
safe strategies for any positive ε. Before we can do this, however, we must review some
results from discrete geometry.
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4 Combinatorics of finite geometry
In this section we review some results in finite geometry that will be useful to construct and
analyze the geometric strategies. In particular, we will focus on bounding the number of
subspaces that fulfil certain properties, which will allow us to bound the number of possible
hands in an announcement and estimate the probabilities mentioned in the last section. The
results in this section are presented without proof.
4.1 Construction of affine and projective spaces
Recall that the δ-dimensional projective space AG(δ, q) arises from (Fq)δ with the standard
vector space structure. With this, the δ-dimensional projective space PG(δ, q) can be con-
structed as a quotient of AG(δ + 1, q)\{0} under the equivalence relation ∼ given by x ∼ y
if and only if x = λy for some λ ∈ Fq . We denote the equivalence class of y by [y].
However, we may also choose to ‘center’ our projective space around any other point of
AG(δ + 1, q). Given x ∈ AG(δ + 1, q), we define a map πx : AG(δ + 1, q) → PG(δ, q) by
πx (y) = [y − x]. Then, V ⊂ PG(δ, q) is an α-plane if and only if there is an (α + 1)-plane
W ⊂ AG(δ+1, q)meeting x such that V = πx (W ), in which case we also write W = ιx (V ).
We have a similar projection from PG(δ + 1, q) into PG(δ, q). Let x ∈ PG(δ + 1, q) and
H be any hyperplane not meeting x . Then, for y ∈ PG(δ + 1, q)\{x} we define π Hx (y) to be
the unique z ∈ H such that x, y, z are collinear. Once again, V ⊂ PG(δ, q) is an α-plane if
and only if there is an (α + 1)-plane W ⊂ PG(δ + 1, q) meeting x such that V = π Hx (W ),
in which case we also write W = ιHx (V ).
These projections commute with intersections with subspaces through x :
Lemma 9 Let q be a prime power and 0 < α ≤ δ.
1. If W ⊂ AG(δ + 1, q) is any α-plane touching x and C ⊂ AG(δ + 1, q)\{x}, then
πx (W ∩ C) = πx (W ) ∩ πx (C).
2. Similarly, if W ⊂ PG(δ + 1, q) is any α-plane touching x, H is a hyperplane avoiding
x and C ⊂ AG(δ + 1, q)\{x}, then π Hx (W ∩ C) = π Hx (W ) ∩ πx (C).
This will be useful later for transferring counting results from one space to another. Now
let us show how to compute some of the basic quantities we will be interested in.
4.2 Counting results in finite geometry






























q . These coefficients are the building block
of many of the counting results we need. It is useful to compute their leading terms:






)α = qαδ + αqαδ−1 + o(qαδ−1).















q . The following is well-known:
Lemma 11 If q is a prime power and 0 ≤ α ≤ δ, any α-plane in AG(δ, q) has qα points
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Meanwhile, the intersection of two distinct α-planes is either empty or a η-plane for some
η < α, which has the following consequence.
Lemma 12 Let q be a prime power and 0 < α ≤ δ.
1. If U, W ⊂ AG(δ, q) are distinct α-planes of AG(δ, q), then |U ∩ W | ≤ qα−1 and
|U ∪ W | ≥ 2qα − qα−1.
2. Similarly, if U, W ⊂ PG(δ, q) are distinct α-planes of PG(δ, q), then |U ∩ W | ≤ [α1
]
q
and |U ∪ W | ≥ qα + [α+11
]
q .
Wemay use Gaussian binomial coefficients to count the number of α-planes, either in the
whole space or meeting some specified set of points.
Lemma 13 Let q be a prime power and 0 < α ≤ δ.






2. If γ ≥ 1, given x1, . . . , xγ ∈ AG(δ, q) that span a (γ −1)-plane, the number of α-planes







3. If γ ≥ 0, given x1, . . . , xγ ∈ PG(δ, q) that span a (γ −1)-plane, the number of α-planes







The following bound from [15] will be essential.
Definition 14 We define a function M : N5 → N given by





















We call the value M(α, γ, δ, q, c) Metsch’s bound.
Theorem 15 If δ ≥ α + γ and C ⊂ PG(δ, q) is such that |C | < [γ+11
]
q , then the number of
α-planes not meeting C is at least M(α, γ, δ, q, |C |).
Equality holds when there is a (γ + 1)-plane D such that C ⊂ D and C meets all lines
of D, in which case we must have |C | ≥ [γ1
]
q . Moreover, if C is fixed, this bound attains its
highest value when taking γ as small as possible so that |C | < [γ+11
]
q .
The following is an immediate corollary of Theorem 15, although it was known previously
[14]. Recall that an α-blocking set is a subset C of PG(δ, q) such that every α-plane meets
C .
Corollary 16 Let 0 < α ≤ δ and q be a prime power. Given a positive integer c ≤ [δ+11
]
1,
there is an α-blocking set of size c in PG(δ, q) if and only if c ≥ [δ−α+11
]
q .
We can also use Theorem 15 to give a similar bound in AG(δ, q).
Corollary 17 If δ ≥ α + γ and C ⊂ AG(δ, q) is such that |C | < [γ+11
]
q , then the number
of α-planes not meeting C is at least
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Proof Consider the embedding e : AG(δ, q) → PG(δ, q) given by e(x1, . . . , xδ) =
[(x1, . . . , xδ, 1)]. Let H ⊂ PG(δ, q) be the hyperplane defined by xδ+1 = 0. Given an
α-plane V ⊂ AG(δ, q), define e˜(V ) to be the least subspace W of PG(δ, q) such that
e[V ] ⊂ W . Then, it is readily checked that e˜(V ) is an α-space in PG(δ, q), and moreover
that e˜ is a bijection between the α-planes in AG(δ, q) and the α-planes in PG(δ, q) not
contained in H .
Then, if C ⊂ AG(δ, q) has c elements, by Theorem 15, there are at least M(α, γ, δ, q, c)
α-planes in PG(δ, q) not meting C , and each one is of the form e˜(V ) for some α-plane




α-planes contained in H , so
we subtract them to obtain our bound. unionsq
We remark, however, that the bound from Corollary 17 is not necessarily tight.
5 The geometric strategies
We’ve informally presented the affine solution to the Russian Cards problem, and will now
formalize it to construct the geometric strategies. The protocols we will use have essentially
appeared in [1,5,19], although we seem to be the first to consider α < δ−1. The basic idea is
to construct a finite geometry where every point represents a different card and Alice’s hand
forms an α-plane. Below, we use f [X ] to denote the set { f (x) : x ∈ X}. Each announcement
is parametrized by a suitable map.
Definition 18 Fix a prime power q , natural numbers 0 < α < δ and A ∈ (Ωa
)
. Let G be
either AG(δ, q) or PG(δ, q). We define a suitable map for A to be a bijection f : Ω → G
such that f [A] is an α-plane.
Given a suitable map f , we define
A[ f ] = {X ⊂ Ω : f [X ] is an α-plane}.
The geometric strategies are then defined by letting Alice choose uniformly from all
suitable maps f and announcing A[ f ].
Definition 19 (The geometric strategies) Let q be a prime power and 0 < α < δ.
We define the affine strategy (with parameters q, α, δ), to be the strategy S such that
SA is the set of all announcements of the form A[ f ], where f : Ω → AG(δ, q) is suitable
for A, and Alice chooses uniformly from SA, in which case we write S = AS(α, δ, q). A
distribution type for AS(α, δ, q) is a triple (a, b, c), where a = qα and a + b + c = qδ .
We similarly define the projective strategy to be the strategy S such that SA is the set of
all announcements of the form A[ f ], where f : Ω → PG(δ, q) is suitable for A, and Alice
chooses uniformly from SA, in which case we write S = AS(α, δ, q). A distribution type
for PS(α, δ, q) is a triple (a, b, c), where a = [α+11
]






Before continuing, let us now show that both strategies are equitable.
Lemma 20 Let q be a prime power and 0 < α < δ. Let S be either AS(α, δ, q) or
PS(α, δ, q), with distribution type (a, b, c). Then, if A, A′ ∈ (Ωa
)
, |SA| = |SA′ |.
Proof Let A, A′ ∈ (Ωa
)
. To show that |SA| = |SA′ |, we will define a bijection  : SA →
SA′ . As a first step, we will build a function σ that permutes the elements of Ω . We know
that |A\A′| = |A′\A|, so we can find a bijection s : A\A′ → A′\A.
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s(x) if x ∈ A\A′
s−1(x) if x ∈ A′\A
x otherwise.
Since s is invertible, σ is well-defined, and it is easy to check that σ is bijective. We then
define  : SA → SA′ given by (A) = {σ [H ]|H ∈ A} for A ∈ SA. Then, it is easy to
see that  has an inverse given by −1(A′) = {σ−1[H ] : H ∈ A′}, where A′ ∈ SA′ , and
hence  is a bijection, so that |SA| = |SA′ | as claimed. unionsq
We have now proven that for every hand that Alice can have there is the same number m of
possible announcements. This permits us to set the probability of a particular announcement
to be chosen to 1/m, and thus the geometric strategies are equitable. As mentioned above, this
will simplify some computations, even without explicitly knowing the value of m.
In the remainder of this sectionwewill prove that the geometric strategies give informative
and weakly safe solutions to the Russian cards problem, provided c satisfies certain bounds.
Lemma 21 Let q be a prime power and 1 ≤ α < δ. Let S be either AS(α, δ, q) or
PS(α, δ, q), with distribution type (a, b, c). Then, S is informative for (a, b, c) if and only if
1. S = AS(α, δ, q) and c < qα − qα−1, or
2. S = PS(α, δ, q) and c < qα .
Proof First assume S = AS(α, δ, q). Let A ∈ (Ωa
)
and B ∈ (Ω\Ab
)
. Let f : Ω → AG(δ, q)
be suitable for A and A = A[ f ]. Clearly A ∈ A, so it remains to check that if A′ ∈ (Ω\Ba
)
is such that A ∈ SA′ , then A = A′.
If this were not the case, then U = f [A] would be an α-space different from U ′ = f [A′].
Since both U and U ′ are disjoint from f [B], then so is U ∪ U ′. By Lemma 12, |U ∪ U ′| ≥
2qα − qα−1. But f is a bijection, so it follows that a + c = |A| + |C | ≥ 2qα − qα−1, and
thus c ≥ qα − qα−1, contradicting our hypothesis.
We conclude that U = U ′, so that also A = A′ and thus the affine strategy is informative
in this case. For the other implication, assume that c ≥ qα − qα−1. Choose two α-planes
V, V ′ such that V ∩ V ′ is an (α − 1)-plane. Then, choose any W not meeting V ∪ V ′ and
such that |W | = c − qα − qα−1. Finally, set A = f −1[V ] and C = f −1[(V ′\V ) ∪ W ]. It is
clear that A[ f ] is not informative for Bob, since he does not know if Alice holds f −1[V ] or
f −1[V ′].
The claim for PS(α, δ, q) is proven similarly, except that here we would have that |U ∪
U ′| ≥ qα + [α+11
]










q = qα . unionsq
Next we must see that, given a card x not held by Cath, there is a nonzero probability that
Alice holds x , which means that it is impossible that there is x ∈ Ω\C such that all α-spaces
passing through x meet C . In the following proofs, we will use the notation from Sect. 4.1.
Lemma 22 Let q be a prime power and 1 ≤ α < δ. Let S be either AS(α, δ, q) or






q and x ∈ Ω\C, there is A ∈ A such that x ∈ A. Moreover, this bound is
optimal.





q and letA[ f ] be any announcement ofAS(α, δ, q). Let
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it is not an (α − 1)-blocking set, and thus there is an (α − 1)-plane W ⊂ PG(δ − 1, q) not
meeting πs(C). But then, U = ιs(W ) is an α-plane containing s and not meeting C . Setting
A′ = f −1[U ], we have that A′ ∈ A[ f ], and x ∈ A′.
Now suppose instead that c ≥ [δ−α+11
]
q . Choose W avoiding 0 such that π0(W ) is an
(α − 1)-blocking set. Then, it is clear that if C = f −1[W ], there is no A′′ disjoint from C
such that 0 ∈ A′′ ∈ A[ f ].
For the projective case, first assume that c+1 < [δ−α+11
]
q and let A[ f ] be any announce-
ment of the protocol. As before, let x be any card and s = f (x). Choose any hyperplane H
not meeting x and let π Hx be the projection onto H through x .










q , so it is
not an (α−1)-blocking set in H , and thus there is an (α−1)-planeU on H notmeetingπx (C).
But then, ιHx (U ) is an α-plane containing x and not meeting C , so that if A
′ = f −1[U ], once
again A′ ∈ A[ f ], and x ∈ A′. For the other implication, if c ≥ [δ−α+11
]
q we let W be an
(α − 1)-blocking set in H and proceed as in the affine case. unionsq
There should also be a nonzero probability that any card not held by Cath is held by Bob.
In other words, if y is not held by Cath, there should be an α-plane avoiding y and Cath’s
hand.
Lemma 23 Let q be a prime power and 1 ≤ α < δ. Let S be either AS(α, δ, q) or
PS(α, δ, q), with distribution type (a, b, c), and A be any announcement of S. Let C ∈ (Ωc
)
and y ∈ Ω\C. Suppose moreover that either
1. S = AS(α, δ, q) and c < [δ−α+11
]
q , or
2. S = PS(α, δ, q) and c + 1 < [δ−α+11
]
q .
Then, there is A ∈ A such that y /∈ A and A ∩ C = ∅. Moreover, the bound in item 2 is
optimal.





q . Let x be any card and
s = f (x). Consider two cases; either f [C]∪{s} is a plane or it is not. If it is, it has dimension
at most δ − α. Extend f [C] ∪ {s} to a plane U of dimension max(δ − α, α) < δ. Then, there
is a plane V parallel to U . If U has dimension α, so does V , and we are done, since if Alice
holds f −1[V ], then Bob holds x . If not, α < δ − α, and we can find V ′ ⊂ V of dimension
α. Once again, if Alice holds f −1[V ′], then Bob holds x .
If f [C] ∪ {s} is not a plane, then there are three collinear points u, v, w such that u, v ∈




q (since πw(u) = πw(v)), and as before there is a plane V meeting w but avoiding
f [C] ∪ {w}. This gives us a possible deal where Bob holds x , by setting A′ = f −1[V ].
Now consider the projective case and assume c + 1 < [δ−α+11
]
q . Once again, let x be any
card and s = f (x). Observe that f [C] ∪ {s} has c + 1 < [δ−α+11
]
q points and is thus not an
α-blocking set of PG(δ, q). It follows that there is an α-plane V not meeting f [C] ∪ {s}. If
Alice holds f −1[V ], then Bob holds s.
To see that this bound is optimal, suppose instead that c ≥ [δ−α+11
]
q . Choose C of the
form f −1[(W\{s}) ∪ W ′], where W is a (δ − α)-plane and W ′ is any set of c − [δ−α+11
]
q
points disjoint from W . Then, every α-plane intersects f [C], so Bob cannot hold x . unionsq
We may summarize Lemmas 22 and 23 in the following:
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Lemma 24 Let q be a prime power and 1 ≤ α < δ. Let S be either AS(α, δ, q) or
PS(α, δ, q), with distribution type (a, b, c). Then, S is weakly secure for (a, b, c) if and
only if
1. S = AS(α, δ, q) and c < [δ−α+11
]
q , or
2. S = PS(α, δ, q) and c + 1 < [δ−α+11
]
q .
Putting together Lemmas 21 and 24 we obtain the main result of this section.
Theorem 25 Let q be a prime power and 1 ≤ α < δ. Let S be either AS(α, δ, q) or
PS(α, δ, q), with distribution type (a, b, c). Then, S is weakly secure and informative for
(a, b, c) if and only if
1. S = AS(α, δ, q) and c < min
(















We may use Theorem 25 to find many tuples (a, b, c) for which the geometric strategies
are weakly secure. If Alice holds a line in the plane, then we may take c to be almost as large
as a:
Corollary 26 There are infinitely many values of a such that for any c ≤ a − 2 there is
b < a2 such that there is an informative and weakly safe strategy for (a, b, c).
Proof Take α = 1, δ = 2 and q an arbitrary prime power and apply Theorem 25 to either
AS(α, δ, q) or PS(α, δ, q). unionsq
On the other hand, if c is much smaller, then we can give Alice a higher-dimensional plane
to ensure that the number of cards is not too large relative to Alice and Cath’s hands.
Corollary 27 Given rational ρ ∈ (0, 1), there are infinitely many values of a such that for
any c < aρ there is b < a1+ρ such that there is an informative and weakly safe strategy for
(a, b, c).
Proof Since ρ is rational, so is 1 + ρ, so we can find 1 ≤ α < δ such that 1 + ρ = δ/α.
Since ρ < 1, for large enough q we have that qρα < qα − qα−1. Thus for such a q we
may use Theorem 25 to see that, for a = qα , c < qδ−α and b = qδ − a − c, AS(α, δ, q) is
informative and weakly safe. Moreover, we have that b < qδ = q(1+ρ)α = a(1+ρ), whereas
c < qδ−α = qρα = αρ was arbitrary, so all desired conditions are met.
Alternately, one may use PS(α, δ, q) setting a = [α+11
]














q − 1 ≥ aρ . unionsq
Observe that in either case, the geometric strategies give us infinitely many solutions for
tuples (a, b, c) with c < a and b < ac.
6 Strong safety of the geometric strategy
Since the geometric strategies are equitable, we may apply the results in Sect. 3 in order to
find parameters for which they are ε-strongly safe. As we have seen, these strategies are
weakly safe if c is relatively small with respect to a and b. Our goal now will be to show
how, for any given ε, one can find tuples for which they are ε-strongly safe.
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6.1 Some auxiliary estimates
Wewill need to find bounds on the number of hands that Cath considers possible.We begin by
counting the total number of hands in an announcement. The following is a direct consequence
of Lemma 13.
Lemma 28 Let q be a prime power and1 ≤ α < δ. The number of a-sets in an announcement












Now let us see how many hands Cath can discard from this announcement. Recall that
A\C denotes the set of lines avoiding C and Ax\C denotes the set of lines avoiding C
that also pass through x . We may compute the probability that Alice holds x from Cath’s
perspective as
P(x ∈ A|C,A) = |Ax\C ||A\C | .
What we are interested in is bounding the quotient of Cath’s perceived probabilities before
and after the announcement, that is,
P(x ∈ A|C,A)




As we will see, by modifying the parameters, this quotient can become arbitrarily close to 1.
In order to find bounds for (1), it suffices to bound the numerator, since the denominator
is constant. Thus we need to estimate |Ax\C | and |A\C |. Let us begin with the latter.
Lemma 29 Let q be a prime power and 1 ≤ α < δ. If A is an announcement of the geometric




































Proof By Lemma 28, |A| = qδ−α [δ
α
]
q . Thus we may estimate the number of α-planes that
meet C and subtract to obtain our bounds.




passing through each point in f [C] and there are c such points, so that the number of hands













The right-hand inequality is obvious, and the argument for PS(α, δ, q) is analogous. unionsq
Lemma 30 Let q be a prime power and 1 ≤ α < δ.
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Proof Once again suppose that A = A[ f ]. First let us bound |Ax\C | from below. To give
our estimate, we will take the number of α-planes passing through f (x) and subtract the
number of α-planes passing through f (x) and f (y) for each y ∈ C , without taking into
account that many α-planes will be subtracted twice. Evidently this bound will not be tight,
































Once again, the upper bound is obvious and the projective case is analogous. unionsq
6.2 Bounding probabilities
The counting lemmas we have given above may be used to bound the probabilities we are
interested in.
Lemma 31 Let q be a prime power and 1 ≤ α < δ. Then, if A is an announcement of either





qδ − 1 ≤
P(x ∈ A|C,A)
P(x ∈ A|C) ≤ 1 +
cqα
qδ − cqα . (6)
Proof We will compute the lower bounds; the upper bounds follow from similar considera-
tions. First assume that A is an announcement of AS(α, δ, q). In this case, using the lower
bound of (4) and the upper bound of (2) we have that
P(x ∈ A|C,A)
P(x ∈ A|C) =
(qδ − c)|Ax\C |





> 1 − cqα
qδ−1 ,
where the last inequality uses the fact that cqα − c + 1 > 0.
If instead A is an announcement of PS(α, δ, q), we use the lower bound of (5) and the
upper bound of (3) to obtain
P(x ∈ A|C,A)


































> 1 − cqα
qδ−1 .
The upper bound of (6) follows from using the upper bounds of Lemma 30 together with the
lower bounds of Lemma 29. Details are left to the reader. unionsq
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6.3 Convergence
Our simple bounds from Lemma 31 will be enough to yield many tuples for which the
geometric strategy is ε-strongly safe for arbitrarily small ε. It is based on the following.
Theorem 32 Let ε > 0, 1 ≤ α < δ and c¯ : N → N be such that c¯(q) = o(qδ−α). Then, if q
is a large enough prime power, both AS(α, δ, q) and PS(α, δ, q) are ε-strongly safe for any
c < c¯(q).
Proof Let A be any announcement of either AS(α, δ, q) or PS(α, δ, q), and x be any card. If
c¯(q) = o(qδ−α) then 1− c¯(q) qα
qδ−1 and 1+ c¯(q) q
α
qδ−c¯(q) qα both converge to 1 as q → ∞. It follows
from Lemma 31 that if q is large and c < c¯(q),
|P(x ∈ A|C,A)P(x ∈ A|C) − 1| < ε,
which means that the geometric strategy is ε-strongly safe. unionsq
However, convergence may be quicker or slower depending on how we choose c¯. For
example, if we fix ξ > 0 and take c¯(q) = qδ−α−ξ , then this quotient will tend to 1, but if
ξ is very small we may need a very large number of cards for it to be less than some given
ε. More generally, we have the following:
Theorem 33 Fix 1 ≤ α < δ, ξ ∈ (0, δ − α) and c¯ : N → N with c¯(q) ≤ qδ−α−ξ , and let S
be either AS(α, δ, q) or PS(α, δ, q). Then, for q a prime power, any announcement A of S,
any card x and any set of C cards with at most c¯(q) elements,
P(x ∈ A|C,A)
P(x ∈ A|C) = 1 + O(1/q
ξ ).
Proof If we take c = c¯(q) ≤ qδ−α−ξ , we have that cqα
qδ−1 ≤ q
δ−ξ
qδ−1 = O(1/qξ ), whereas
cqα
qδ − cqα ≤
qδ−ξ
qδ − qδ−ξ = O(1/q
ξ ).
The theorem then follows from Lemma 31. unionsq
Here we see a trade-off between keeping Cath’s hand relatively large and obtaining a good
rate of convergence for our bounds. Observe, however, that the larger c is, the less tight our
bounds are, so despite our bounds converging rather slowly there may be smaller examples
with a large degree of security. Because of this, in the next section we turn our attention to
finding tighter bounds.
7 Improved bounds
As we have seen, ε-strongly safe solutions to the Russian cards problem exist provided we
take large enough q and c relatively small. However, the boundswe have given, while suitable
for establishing existence, are not too precise. In this section, we will provide improvements
to Lemmas 29 and 30 that will later be useful in identifying triples (a, b, c) which are not
too large and for which the geometric protocols are ε-strongly safe.
We will use the following, which is an immediate consequence of Lemma 9:
Lemma 34 Let 1 ≤ α < δ and q be a prime power.
1. If x /∈ C ⊂ AG(δ + 1, q) the number of α-planes touching x and avoiding C is equal to
the number of (α − 1)-planes on PG(δ, q) avoiding πx (C), and
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2. if x /∈ C ⊂ AG(δ+1, q) the number of α-planes on PG(δ+1, q) touching x and avoiding
C is equal to the number of (α − 1)-planes on PG(δ, q) avoiding π Hx (C), where H is
any hyperplane not meeting x.
With this we obtain some exact bounds for the affine and projective protocols. Recall that
M(α, γ, δ, q, c) denotes Metsch’s bound (see Definition 14).






q . Let S be either AS(α, δ, q) or PS(α, δ, q), A = A[ f ] for some suitable function
f , C ∈ (Ωc
)
and x ∈ Ω\C.
1. If S = AS(α, δ, q), then
(a) M(α − 1, γ, δ − 1, q, c) ≤ |Ax\C | and





2. If S = PS(α, δ, q), then
(a) M(α − 1, γ, δ − 1, q, c) ≤ |Ax\C | and
(b) M(α, γ, δ, q, c) ≤ |A\C |.
Proof Let s = f (x) and W = f [C]. First assume that S = AS(α, δ, q). To bound |Ax\C |,
note that by Lemma 34, the number of α-planes in AG(δ, q) touching s but missing W is
the same as the number of (α − 1)-planes in PG(δ − 1, q) missing πs[W ]. But by Theorem
15 applied to πs[W ], there are at least M(α − 1, γ, δ − 1, q, c) such (α − 1)-planes, giv-
ing us a lower bound for |Ax\C |, as claimed. The lower bound for |A\C | follows similar
considerations and is a direct consequence of Corollary 17.
Now consider S = PS(α, δ, q). To bound |Ax\C |, choose a hyperplane H not meeting s





q points. Thus we can apply
Theorem 15 on H to see that there are at least M(α−1, γ, δ−1, q, c) (α−1)-planes on H not
intersecting π Hs [W ], thus this also gives a lower bound for the number of α-planes meeting
s but not W and thus on |Ax\C |. The last bound arises directly from applying Theorem 15
on PG(δ, q). unionsq
Now let us turn our attention to our upper bounds, which may also be improved quite a
bit.
Lemma 36 Let q, α, δ be such that q is a prime power and 1 ≤ α < δ. Let S be either
AS(α, δ, q) or PS(α, δ, q), A = A[ f ] for some suitable function f , C ∈ (Ωc
)
and x ∈ Ω\C.






















































Proof We prove the first claim. Set s = f (x) and W = f [C]. We first show that there are at
least
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α-planes meeting both s and W .












α-planes passing through each of these points













them, possibly with repetitions, obtaining (7). The first item of the lemma is then immediate





q points meeting s.
The argument for S = PS(α, δ, q) is analogous. unionsq
Lemma 37 Let q, α, δ be such that q is a prime power and 1 ≤ α < δ. Let S be either
AS(α, δ, q) or PS(α, δ, q), A = A[ f ] for some suitable function f and C ∈ (Ωc
)
.
1. If S = AS(α, δ, q), then













































Proof This is similar to the proof of Lemma 36. We consider the affine case; the argument




















q α-planes meeting each element of W









such pairs, so we subtract to obtain (8). The first item of the lemma is then






Example 38 In floating-point arithmetic, one represents real numbers using a fixed, finite
number of digits; very commonly, eight digits are used. In this setting, it may be that the
rounding error when computing our probability quotient is larger than the quotient itself. If
this is the case, we may obtain a level of security which is indistinguishable from perfect
security with respect to the representation method chosen to store numbers. Thus we will say
that a strategyS isfloating point-perfectly secure for the triple (a, b, c) if it is 10−8-strongly
secure.
We can use the bounds provided in this section to find parameters for which the affine
strategy is floating point-perfectly secure. Indeed, let q = 13, α = 2 and δ = 10. This
gives rise to the triple (a, b, c) where a = 169, b = 137,858,491,676 and c = 4. Although
the number of cards is rather large, this triple is remarkable in that the affine strategy is
floating-point perfectly secure for it; indeed, AS(2, 10, 13) is 3.65 × 10−9-strongly secure
for this choice of parameters. Following this idea, we can always find triples for which we
can construct floating-point perfectly secure strategies for any c, although as this example
shows the deck may be quite large.
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Table 1 Some choices of
parameters for the geometric
strategy along with their
respective lower and upper
bounds computed using Lemmas
35, 36 and 37. These triples were
found by fixing c, α, δ and
searching for small values of q
such that the protocols became at
least 0.05-strongly safe
a b c S q α δ Lower Upper
8 53 3 AS 2 3 6 0.9838 1.0205
8 117 3 AS 2 3 7 0.9968 1.0041
16 236 4 AS 2 4 8 0.9952 1.0051
7 501 3 PS 2 2 8 0.9998 1.0121
9 4666 6 PS 8 1 4 0.9999 1.0086
13 3259 8 PS 3 2 7 0.9998 1.0186
8 Choosing good parameters
In this sectionwewill focus on finding specific choices of parameters for which the geometric
strategies are ε-strongly safe. For illustration, wewill fix ε = 0.05, and use our bounds to find
several explicit tuples for which the geometric strategies are at least ε-strongly safe (Table
1). It is interesting to compare this to [19], where many choices of parameters for which the
protocol is perfectly safe are exhibited. All of the tuples presented there have c ≤ 3, and
the authors discuss the difficulty of finding perfectly safe strategies for larger c. As we shall
see this becomes substantially simpler if we weaken our requirements to, e.g., 0.05-strong
safety. Thus we may argue that passing to a weaker notion of security allows us to make the
Russian cards problem substantially easier to solve while providing Cath with an arbitrarily
small amount of probabilistic information.
8.1 Perfectly secure strategies
The notion of perfect security for the Russian cards problem was introduced in [20], where
several examples with c = 1 are provided. In [19], it is further shown that an equitative
strategy S is perfectly secure if and only if each of its announcements is a (c + 1)-design.
In this subsection we will show how perfect security for c = 1 follows from our bounds and
extend this to some instances with c = 2 (Table 2).
Corollary 39 Let 1 ≤ α < δ and q be a prime power. Let S be either AS(α, δ, q) or
PS(α, δ, q) and (a, b, 1) be a distribution type for S. Then, S is perfectly safe for (a, b, 1).
Proof The lower bounds fromLemmas 30 and 29 are equal to the upper bounds fromLemmas
36 and 37, respectively (recall that
(n
m
) = 0 when n < m). Thus equality holds in both cases,
and it is then straightforward to check that P(x ∈ A|C,A) = P(x ∈ A|C). unionsq
Hence our bounds give an alternative proof that the geometric strategies are perfectly
secure when c = 1. In fact, a simple counting argument shows that when q = 2 = c we also
attain perfect security, which is consistent with the results from [19].
Theorem 40 Let 3 ≤ α < δ and (a, b, 2) be a distribution type for S = AS(α, δ, 2). Then,
S is perfectly safe for (a, b, 2).
Proof No three points in AS(α, δ, 2) can be collinear. Thus, equality holds in Lemma 13.2,
and using this we obtain, by the computations used for proving Lemmas 36 and 37, that for
any announcement A, any C ∈ (Ω2
)
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Table 2 Choices of parameters
(a, b, c) for S = AS(α, δ, q) or
S = PS(α, δ, q) such that S is
informative and perfectly safe for
(a, b, c)
a b c S q α δ
3 5 1 AS 3 1 2
8 6 2 AS 2 3 4
16 14 2 AS 2 4 5
3 3 1 PS 2 1 2
4 8 1 PS 3 1 2
7 7 1 PS 2 2 3
It is then straightforward to check that |Ax\C ||A\C | = 2
α
2δ−2 , and thus P(x ∈ A|C,A) =
P(x ∈ A|C). unionsq
8.2 Making Cath’s hand large
Suppose that we wish to obtain good tuples for which c is as large as possible relative to
Alice’s hand. Cath’s hand is bounded by two expressions on α, one which increases when α
grows (c < qα−qα−1) and onewhich, instead, decreases (c = o(qδ−α)). Thus, themaximum
value that c may take is when the two bounds coincide, which occurs approximately when
δ = 2α or δ = 2α + 1.
The latter case is interesting, since we already have that qα − qα−1 < qδ−α−1. Thus
in cases that Alice holds relatively few cards, less than the square root of the deck, our
informativity bound will already give us ε-strong safety for large values of q . To be precise,
we have the following:
Corollary 41 Let ε, β > 0 and ρ ∈ (0, 1). Then, there are infinitely many values of a such
that for any c < ρa there is b < a2+β so that there is an informative and ε-strongly safe
strategy for (a, b, c).
Proof Let ε, β > 0 and ρ ∈ (0, 1). Pick α large enough so that 1/α ≤ β and Q large enough
so that 1/Q < (1−ρ)/2. Set δ = 2α + 1 and c¯(q) = qα + qα−1 − 1. Then, since δ −α = α + 1
we have that c¯(q) = o(qδ−α), from which it follows from Theorem 32 that for large q ,
AS(α, δ, q) is informative and ε-strongly safe for a = qα , c ≤ c¯(q) and b = qδ − a − c. In
particular we may also take q > Q, so that
c¯(q) = qα − qα−1 − 1 = (1 − 1/q − 1/qα)a > ρa.
Meanwhile, b < qδ = (qα) 2α+1α < a2+β, so all desired conditions are met.
Alternately, one can take c¯(q) = qα . Then, ([α+11
]
q




q = O(q2α+1). In particular, wemay chooseα large enough so thatα(2+β) > 2α+1.

















q . Thus if we set
a = [α+11
]
q , c < q
α and b = [δ+11
]
q − a − c with q large enough, PS(α, δ, q) is informative
and ε-strongly safe with all desired properties. unionsq
Compare the above result to Corollary 26. As before we can have c = O(a), but this time
instead of having b < ac we must take b = O(ac1+β). Thus the price of obtaining ε-strong
security is to make Bob’s hand a bit larger than we would need for weak security. In Table 3,
we fix values of ρ and β and use the strategy of Corollary 41 and its proof to find tuples for
which the strategies are 0.05-strongly secure.
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Table 3 Choices of parameters
(a, b, c) for S = AS(α, δ, q) or
S = PS(α, δ, q) with b < a2+β
and c ≈ ρa such that S is
informative and at least
0.05-strongly safe strategy for
(a, b, c), using the constructions
of Corollary 41
a b c S q α δ ρ Lower Upper
8 117 3 AS 2 3 7 3/8 0.9968 1.0041
9 231 3 AS 3 2 5 1/3 0.9986 1.0357
16 489 7 AS 2 4 9 7/16 0.9926 1.0081
25 3091 9 AS 5 2 5 9/25 0.999 1.0482
32 2001 15 AS 2 5 11 9/20 0.9895 1.0109
64 8105 23 AS 2 6 13 7/20 0.9952 1.0048
31 989 3 PS 2 4 9 3/16 0.999 1.0312
127 16,253 3 PS 2 6 13 1/32 0.9999 1.0078
21 1339 5 PS 4 2 5 5/16 0.9985 1.0468
255 65,275 5 PS 2 7 15 3/80 0.9999 1.0078
31 3867 8 PS 5 2 5 3/10 0.9991 1.0481
121 29,386 17 PS 3 4 9 1/5 0.9991 1.0466
8.3 Making Bob’s hand small
Wemay also give a ε-strongly secure analogue of Corollary 27. Suppose that we instead want
to have a small number of cards in Bob’s hand relative to Alice’s. In our above construction
Bob’s hand grew relatively quickly, so we want a different strategy for selecting parameters.
The trade-off will be that Cath’s hand may be substantially smaller than Alice’s. In general if
we want Bob to have less than a1+β cards, then Cath must have less than aρ for some ρ < β.
Corollary 42 Let ε > 0, ρ ∈ (0, 1) and β > ρ be such that β ∈ Q. Then, there are infinitely
many values of a such that for any c < aρ there is b < a1+β such that there is an informative
and ε-strongly safe strategy for (a, b, c).
Proof Similar to the proof of Corollary 27, but taking c < qρα and using Theorem 32. unionsq
Once again, we may obtain ε-strong security for infinitely many tuples (a, b, c) where
c < a and b = O(ac1+β). So the takeaway in either case is that, making Bob’s hand only
a bit bigger compared to the rest of the deck and choosing an appropriately large deck, we
may obtain ε-strong security instead of merely weak security. In Table 4 we use this idea to
find additional tuples for which the geometric strategies are 0.05-safe or better.
Table 4 Choices of parameters
(a, b, c) for S = AS(α, δ, q) or
S = PS(α, δ, q) such that
c ≈ aρ , b < a1+β and S is
informative and at least
0.05-strongly safe for (a, b, c)
a b c S q α δ ρ Lower Upper
32 477 3 AS 2 5 9 4/5 0.9956 1.0045
256 3837 3 AS 2 8 12 1/2 0.9953 1.0047
16 108 4 AS 2 4 7 3/4 0.9721 1.0294
64 1978 6 AS 2 6 11 5/6 0.9952 1.0048
400 19,205 3 PS 7 3 5 2/3 0.9995 1.0424
341 21,499 5 PS 4 4 7 3/4 0.9984 1.0498
1365 348,157 3 PS 4 5 9 4/5 0.9999 1.0078
3906 2,437,492 8 PS 5 5 9 4/5 0.9999 1.0096
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9 Concluding remarks
While the Russian cards provides a setting for unconditionally safe communication, many
known solutions to the Russian cards problem are only weakly safe, meaning that they may
provide the eavesdropper with probabilistic information. Although perfectly secure solutions
are known to exist, it is somewhat difficult to construct the designs required to attain this
level of security. In this paper we have shown, however, that the amount of probabilistic
information obtained by the eavesdropper may be controlled, to the extent that in some cases
we can obtain a degree of safety indistinguishable from perfect safety with respect to floating
point computation. Weakening the notion of perfect security has led to an infinite number of
new tuples for which we may still obtain a high degree of security, and indeed the bounds
we have given may be used to analyze the level of security in any instance of the geometric
strategies. Moreover, our techniques had the added bonus of replicating some results of [20].
There are further directions that may be explored. Although many of our bounds are tight,
some of them can be improved using a deeper combinatorial analysis. This might lead to
smaller values of (a, b, c) for which the geometric strategies are ε-strongly safe that we were
not able to identify.
Finally, this analysis could be generalized further to include other combinatorial construc-
tions, for example considering a wider class of designs. Such efforts could very well lead to
more flexible methods of finding tuples for which there are strategies with very high levels
of security.
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